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In Search of a Uniform Policy-
State and Federal Sources of
Consumer Financial Services Law
By FRED H. MILLER* and RALPH J. ROHNER**
Any effort to project the vectors of development in the law affecting
consumer financial services for the 1980s must take into account the sources
from which the legal ground rules will emanate. Those sources are in one sense
bifurcated-i.e., the states have long had a significant role in regulating
consumer credit and related consumer transactions, and, since 1968, the
federal government has been substantially and increasingly involved in
standard setting for consumer financial transactions.
At these two levels of government there is further fragmentation of the
lawmaking function. Each of the fifty states, and countless local government
entities, enact laws without reference to the lawmaking in neighboring
jurisdictions or in Washington; attempts to generate uniform state laws have
had limited success. At the federal level, it is tempting to think that
congressional legislation is perforce of uniform applicability across the nation,
and that friction between federal and state initiatives (posed in terms of the
preemption of state and local laws by federal standards) can be kept to a
minimum. Yet a cursory examination reveals that standards explicitly set by
Congress are barely the tip of the federal lawmaking iceberg. The most
voluminous federal regulations are generated from federal administrative
agencies, among whom there is as much balkanization as among the states.
This article reviews these complex sources of law, and suggests the possible
courses of evolution over the next decade.
I. BEFORE 1970-PRIMARILY A STATE REGULATORY CONCERN
A. Mostly Local Markets
As little as a decade ago, in a discussion concerning consumer credit in the
1970s, it was postulated that "consumer credit is preponderantly small and
local in both its nature and operation."' That view was confirmed by the
National Commission on Consumer Finance, which stated that "for the most
part there is no national market for consumer credit. Consumers seldom shop
for credit outside their town or city, although there is some mail order
*Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Member of the Oklahoma bar.
**Professor of Law, Catholic University School of Law. Member of the Maryland bar.
1. Malcolm, Consumer Credit-Probings into the Future, 26 Bus. Law. 899, 900 (1971).
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business.... But generally, the market for consumer credit is fairly restricted
geographically." 2
Accordingly, prior to about 1970 substantially all of the control in this field
rested with the states. Compared to the range and complexity of federal and
state regulation in 1982, of course, the pre-1970 coverage of state laws was
limited in scope to usury, licensing of certain lenders, some disclosure through
retail installment sales acts, limitations on a few creditor remedies, but not
much more.'
B. Emerging National Trends
In May 1968, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act.4 In the minds of
most observers it represented a massive shift of control from the states to the
federal level. Predictions abounded, of course, that there would be further
federal intrusion because, once started, such developments have their own
momentum and, in that consumer era, it was politically attractive for
Congress to display its interest.'
But there were more significant reasons for the federal incursion. In its 1972
report, the National Commission on Consumer Finance perceived that even
then the primarily local picture it was painting was subject to change. For
example, it recognized that open-end credit was surely the trend of the future;
it observed that a majority of credit card banks already were linked in
nationwide interchanges that continued to expand; and it predicted the link
among this development, credit information systems, and future electronic
funds transfer systems. The commission noted that "the mobility of the
population and the growth of credit cards demand a nationwide system of
credit information," and that "a uniform EFTS will ultimately be necessary to
make it workable."' Clearly nonlocal matters demanded uniform rules, and
thus it was not by accident that the Fair Credit Reporting7 and Electronic
Fund Transfer Acts" are federal laws.
There was another factor. The states had quantities of what could be called
consumer credit legislation, but its content and scope varied from state to state
and from industry to industry. In part this was due to local considerations, to
historical progression, and to lobbying efforts of uneven success. Only undue
charity would allow a description of state law at the time as other than a
hodgepodge." As long as credit remained local and small in nature and
2. National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United States II
(1972).
3. Malcolm, supra note I, at 900. See generally, B. Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit
Legislation (1965).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613, 1631-1644, 1661-1665 (1976), as amended.
5. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note I, at 899-900.
6. Nat'l Commission, supra note 2, at 207, 213.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (Supp. 1978).
9. Malcolm, supra note 1, at 899-900.
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operation, this was perhaps not a critical problem. But as the National
Commission further observed:
[Dlepository institutions now having dual chartering often grant credit to
business firms and consumers far removed from the locale where they
obtain their savings. As depository institutions and credit grantors
operating on a fairly wide geographical scale, commercial banks and
savings and loan associations are endowed with a large measure of
national interest.10
The consumer credit marketplace of 1970, in other words, was increasingly
becoming an interstate and even nationwide market.
C. Quests for Uniformity
The dawning of a national market for consumer credit generated activity to
draft uniform laws to regulate it. A proposal by the body most involved with
uniform state laws, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, was the Uniform Consumer Credit Code." It was immediately
enacted by Oklahoma and Utah, and later by a number of other states so that
today about twenty percent of the states have a version of it.'" In addition,
portions of it were picked up by other jurisdictions. 3
On the federal level, legislation which put in place uniform rules across the
United States also was quickly and continually enacted from 1968 onward, in
those areas where rapid action was considered desirable. First was the Truth
in Lending Act,' aimed at providing accurate information about credit costs
and terms, essential if the credit market was to function rationally on the basis
of informed consumer choice. Other enactments emphasizing the disclosure or
informational function were the Consumer Leasing Act' 5 and, in part, the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act.' 6 To assure the availability of accurate infor-
mation about consumers, equally necessary for a rational market, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act 7 was passed, and to preclude irrational bias, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act 8 was also enacted. Other laws aimed at improving
the efficiency and fairness of the credit market were the Fair Credit Billing
Act,'9 restrictions on garnishment, 0 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act2'
10. Nat'l Commission, supra note 2, at 164.
I1. Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1969 and 1974 official texts with comments) in
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1970 and
1974).
12. The states are Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming.
13. For example, the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
14. Supra note 4.
15. U.S.C. §§ 1687-1687e (1976).
16. Supra note 8.
17. Supra note 7.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1976).
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and, again in part, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.2 Further in this respect,
the Federal Trade Commission promulgated uniform rules on door-to-door
sales2" and holder in due course," and has other proposals in the pipeline.
II. THE 1970s-SHARED FEDERAL AND STATE CONCERNS
A. Lack of Uniformity
During the decade of the 1970s both federal and state governments
increased their respective involvements in regulating the consumer financial
services marketplace, but consistent or uniform approaches were not achieved
at either level.
1. STATE LEVEL
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code did not achieve the uniformity of
consumer credit laws it sought. The states initially enacting it did not enact it
in its uniform version; for example, Oklahoma made over 200 nonuniform
amendments. Some of the substantive ones, and other changes, then were used
in a rewrite of the code adopted by later states. Hardly any states have actively
considered the code as a whole in recent years.215 But the true failure of the
code lay in the fact it was too visionary in its rate structure and in its
perception of the unitary nature of the consumer credit market, and not
visionary enough in working out the progression of future change and in
defining the scope of the subject.26 Accordingly, many of the same forces and
interest groups that had created the hodgepodge the code sought to replace
opted to keep the comfortable, but outmoded, system in a majority of the
states. This is not to say that state law remained stagnant during the 1970s.
Far from it, in fact, for laws dealing with all aspects of the consumer financial
services market gushed from the state legislatures during the decade. The vast
but fragmented nature of state law is apparent to anyone browsing through
the state law volumes of the CCH Consumer Credit Guide; successful
attempts to synthesize or organize this material are nonexistent or outdated.
2. FEDERAL LEVEL
Uniformity hardly was achieved on the federal level either. Despite the
nationwide applicability of the many pieces of federal legislation during the
1970s, true uniformity of law was frustrated for several reasons. One was the
policy of limited preemption of state laws, discussed in more detail below.
Another arose from the fact that the real federal lawmaking was embodied
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1976).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. 1978).
22. Supra note 8.
23. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1981).
24. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1981), as proposed to be amended, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,711 (1979).
25. The last state to enact the code was South Carolina, in 1976. Only Minnesota has given it
serious consideration since then.
26. See, e.g., Prefatory Note to 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
Consumer Financial Services Law in the 1980s • 1419
less in the congressional statutes than in the multi-faceted regulatory activi-
ties of the federal agencies charged with implementing federal legislation.
While we do not suggest that the federal agencies' role is necessarily more
significant than that of the state governments, the interplay among those
federal agencies is more complex and the implications more subtle.
The structure through which Congress and the federal agencies set nation-
wide standards for the consumer credit marketplace is a reflection of a series
of historical accidents more than of a rational plan. Rulemaking and enforce-
ment by the various agencies have created conflicts, overlaps, and gaps in the
applicable standards; uneven compliance burdens for creditors; and lack of
uniformity in the administration of consumer protections."7 USLife Credit
Corp. v. FTC"s is an example. There the Fifth Circuit overturned an FTC
administrative final order, issued in an enforcement proceeding, as going
beyond the literal requirements of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z29
in connection with the disclosure of consumer credit insurance. 30 This brief
example cannot alone convey the full extent of the problem, however.
The present federal rulemaking structure developed through a series of
largely unrelated and uncoordinated events. It involves more than a half a
dozen agencies engaged in standard setting through formal regulations that
implement legislation, rulemaking for unfair and deceptive practices, ad hoc
regulations on particular matters, informal guides and policies, and enforce-
ment activity.
Congress has assigned regulatory responsibilities in different ways to
different agencies. Typically, federal legislation states rather broad policy
goals, and Congress delegates extensive rulemaking power to supervisory
agencies. Congress may delegate rulemaking authority (a) by an explicit
mandate to an agency to flesh out statutory details (e.g., the Truth in Lending
Act); 1 (b) by stating a general standard that an agency is to enforce (e.g.,
unfair or deceptive acts or practices); 32 or (c) by implicitly authorizing
rulemaking by an agency as an incident to its chartering or supervisory
responsibilities for a class of institutions (e.g., the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency for national banks, or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for federally
27. See Rohner, "'For Lack of a National Policy on Consumer Credit ...": Preliminary
Thoughts on the Need for Unified Federal Agency Rulemaking, 35 Bus. Law. 135 (1979).
28. 599 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1979).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1981). Regulation Z is the implementing regulation under the Truth in
Lending Act.
30. The FTC is a regulatory agency charged with enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act for
certain types of creditors. The board of governors of the federal reserve system is likewise an
enforcement body for other creditors but also was delegated overall regulation authority pursuant
to the act.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976) (§5 of the FTC Act).
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chartered or insured savings and loan associations)." Congress has in fact
delegated all three types of authority in the consumer credit area.
(a) Direct Regulation
No less than seven agencies have issued formal regulations and rules
directly affecting the consumer credit market. The Federal Reserve Board has
exclusive regulation writing authority for all creditors under the Truth in
Lending Act, including consumer leasing" (regulations Z and M);35 equal
credit opportunity (Regulation B); 7 and electronic fund transfers 6 (Regula-
tion E).19 No agency is authorized to issue regulations under the Fair Credit
Reporting4" and Fair Debt Collection Practices" Acts.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB),
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) have statutory authority
to issue rules that define "with specificity" unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. 2 The FTC has promulgated two rules that have an impact on
consumer credit transactions: the preservation of consumer claims and de-
fenses43 rule (holder rule); and the door-to-door sales rule." A rule on the sale
of used motor vehicles has been issued,4" but at this writing awaits congres-
sional review and possible legislative veto. Two others have been pending since
1975: an extension of the holder rule (approved in principle by the FTC in
i 979),6 and the credit practices rule.47 Neither the Federal Reserve Board nor
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has as yet issued any independent rules
under this authority. However, if the FTC does issue a rule, both the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board are required to issue
substantially similar rules within sixty days, unless the FRB or FHLBB
determine that the practices of banks and savings and loan associations are
not unfair or deceptive, or unless a companion rule would interfere with
essential policies of those agencies. Thus FTC rulemaking may trigger
rulemaking by the other agencies.
33. Agency rulemaking in this area has generally been sustained as a proper exercise of broad
enabling powers. See, e.g., Conference of Federal Savings and Loan Associations v. Stein, 604
F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), affld mem. 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
34. Supra notes 4 and 15.
35. 12 C.F.R. §§ 213, 226 (1981).
36. Supra note 18.
37. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1981).
38. Supra note 8.
39. 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1981).
40. Supra note 7.
41. Supra note 21.
42. The authority of all three agencies is provided in section 18(f) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(f) (1976), as amended.
43. Supra note 24.
44. Supra note 23.
45. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 455).
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,771 (1979).
47. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975).
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A number of agencies have issued regulations pursuant to specific statutes
or under their inherent powers. The Federal Reserve Board, through its
Regulation C,48 dictates the compilation and disclosure of mortgage invest-
ment data by all mortgage lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act. 9 Each of the agencies having responsibility under the Community
Reinvestment Act," (Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Home Loan Bank
Board) has issued regulations to implement that act.5 The Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) implements the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act 52 disclosure scheme for all mortgage lenders through its
Regulation X. 3 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has issued regulations '
for the residential mortgage preemption provisions of title V of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA),55 applica-
ble to all creditors. Finally, three agencies have issued regulations authorizing
variable or adjustable rate mortgages or loans for institutions they supervise,
on the authority of the agencies' organic acts.56
(b) Indirect Standard-Setting
In addition to rulemaking, each agency can, and most do, set compliance
standards for institutions they supervise without formal regulations. Line
agencies may issue unofficial interpretations of statutes, whether or not that
agency or another agency has issued formal regulations on the subject.
Examples are FTC interpretations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; 7
Comptroller of the Currency letters construing the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act;58 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, and National Credit Union Administration interpretations of the most
favored lender provisions of DIDMCA.5 9
Agencies may adopt policy statements of general applicability. An example
is the policy statement on disposition of income from the sale of credit life
insurance adopted by the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insur-
48. 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1981).
49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976).
50. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. 1979).
51. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,144-62 (1978).
52. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976).
53. 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (1981).
54. 12 C.F.R. § 590 (1981).
55. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (1980).
56. They are: Comptroller of the Currency (12 C.F.R. § 29); Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(12 C.F.R. § 545 subchapter C); and National Credit Union Administration (12 C.F.R. § 701.
21-6B).
57. 16 C.F.R. § 600, subchapter F.
58. See, e.g., those reprinted at 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 42,091-42,096.
59. FHLBB: 12 C.F.R. § 570.11; NCUA: 12 C.F.R. § 741 (1981). The FDIC interpretation is
in the form of an unofficial, unpublished letter from its general counsel.
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ance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency, but rejected by
FHLBB and NCUA.60
Agencies also may promulgate informal ground rules to guide their enforce-
ment practices. Examples are examination policies set by the Federal Finan-
cial Institutions Examination Council (comprising all five financial institu-
tions regulators) for compliance with the Truth in Lending,61 Equal Credit
Opportunity,"2 Electronic Fund Transfer,2 and Community Reinvestment"
Acts.
(c) Standard-Setting Through Enforcement
Finally, as the USLife case 65 illustrates, through ad hoc cease and desist
proceedings, agencies create a body of quasi precedent. Such a pattern has
been particularly discernible in the activity of the Federal Trade Commission.
The FTC has issued a number of orders (consent and litigated) under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, neither of
which has implementing regulations. Seven agencies have entered cease and
desist orders in cases under the Truth in Lending and Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Acts, where the controlling regulations are issued by the Federal Reserve
Board.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the present federal regulatory structure
creates frictions among agencies and produces inconsistent, overlapping, and
at times contradictory rules.
(d) Blurred Jurisdictional Lines
The agencies' regulatory roles often do not align with the agencies'
supervisory responsibilities for discrete segments of the credit industry. For
example, Federal Reserve Board regulations B, C, E, M, and Z are applicable
to all creditors or financial institutions, even though the Board supervises only
about 1,000 commercial banks. The FHLBB's regulation on usury preemp-
tion applies to all mortgage lenders, even though the agency supervises only
savings and loan associations. Some of the more obvious problems thus
generated include: (a) the agency writing plenary regulations may have no
first-hand experience, through examinations or the like, with the practices of
institutions affected by the regulation. For example, the Federal Reserve
Board has no institutional experience with retailer credit; (b) input from line
supervisory agencies to the regulator agency tends to be limited and at arm's
length (Thus, the FTC routinely provides reports and written submissions to
the Federal Reserve Board on truth in lending and equal credit opportunity
60. As reported in Wash. Credit Letter, June 8, 1981, at 5.
61. 44 Fed. Reg. 1222 (1979), supplanted by a joint statement of enforcement policy, 45 Fed.
Reg. 48,712 (1980).
62. 46 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1981).
63. Unpublished (reported in Wash. Credit Letter, July 21, 1980, at 4).
64. 45 Fed. Reg. 63,133 (1980).
65. Supra note 27.
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but regular staff consultation is absent); and (c) where one agency's regula-
tion is enforced by other agencies, it is nearly impossible to assure consistent
application of regulatory standards.
Moreover, where several agencies are authorized to regulate comparable
transactions for their respective constituencies, the resulting regulatory
schemes can be inconsistent. This creates different ground rules for transac-
tions that are functionally identical, depending on which agency's rule is
applicable. Thus, three federal agencies (the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Credit Union Administra-
tion) have issued regulations authorizing variable or adjustable rate mort-
gages. All three regulations can have significant impact on the overall
mortgage market, yet each regulation establishes substantively different rules
on maximum rate adjustments, maximum repayment schedules, negative
amortization, and disclosure, among other matters.66 Further, two of the three
adjustable-rate mortgage regulations just noted (OCC and FHLBB) call for
disclosure at different times, in different terminology, and in different levels of
detail, from the general credit-cost disclosure rules of the Federal Reserve
Board embodied in its Regulation Z.
(e) Spillover Effect
Even where an agency's regulation is directly applicable only to creditors or
institutions supervised by that agency, the regulation can have direct and
significant impact on segments of the market outside the regulator's jurisdic-
tion. The OCC and FHLBB regulations on variable rate mortgages affect the
acceptability of those instruments in the secondary mortgage market. The
major public investors (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) have adopted quite
different policies toward the instruments approved by the two regulatory
agencies; thus those agency regulations influence the overall intermediation of
mortgage money. In further illustration, the FTC holder rule imposes compli-
ance burdens exclusively on sellers, who are subject to FTC jurisdiction. But
much of the paper bearing the FTC holder legend (exposing the holder to
consumer claims and defenses) is assigned to banks, over whom the FTC has
no jurisdiction. Thus the FTC effectively regulates the banks' risk. Except
through informal consultation during the rulemaking process, the bank
regulators are powerless to influence this allocation.
Also, at least in theory, when the FTC issues a trade regulation rule
applicable to FTC-supervised institutions, the Federal Reserve Board and the
FHLBB will issue "substantially similar" rules for banks and savings and
loans, respectively. But no such companion rule may ever materialize if there
are fundamental differences of outlook or policy among the agencies." The
66. See note 56, supra.
67. An example occurred in 1980 when Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board
wrote Chairman Pertschuk of the FTC suggesting withdrawal of the commission's pending credit
practices rule. Letter, Volcker to Pertschuk, Dec. 22, 1980.
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result would be imbalance in the compliance burdens and consumer protec-
tions in comparable transactions in different sectors of the marketplace.
Of course, the same kind of inconsistency or imbalance results when, at an
informal or policy level, one agency's position differs from another agency's
when both are addressing the same issue. Further, although transactions
across the marketplace may be subject to identical standards by statute or by
a plenary regulation (such as Regulation Z, applicable to all creditors), in fact
different and inconsistent standards may be applied by individual supervisory
agencies through their interpretations of what those fixed standards mean.
Examples include: (a) the most-favored-lender interpretations under title V of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(That statute accords federally insured state banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, and credit unions the same preferential interest rate policy as national
banks have enjoyed for years.60 But the respective supervisory agencies, FDIC,
FHLBB, and NCUA, have each construed the statutory policy differently.
Thus, NCUA interprets the policy as not applicable to federally chartered
credit unions,69 while the FHLBB would subject savings and loan associations
to all consumer protection provisions in the "borrowed" rate law);7" (b)
despite uniform enforcement guidelines for TIL reimbursement provisions,71
there are indications that the separate examiner corps of each agency are
producing quite different numbers and amounts of restitution orders; and (c)
the FTC seems to expect greater specificity in reasons for adverse action under
Regulation B than the regulation literally requires.
(f) Attitudinal Differences
Finally, each agency's position on consumer protection matters is influ-
enced by the agency's tradition and overall supervisory responsibilities. As
these differ from agency to agency, it is not surprising that the agency decision
makers reflect those conventions differently in their handling of consumer
credit regulatory matters.
Since 1938 the FTC has operated under a broad mandate to police unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the market place, primarily through
prosecutorial cease and desist proceedings, and only more recently through
rule writing. Under a broad mandate like the FTC's, the commission believes
it is necessary at times to insist on compliance procedures that may go
somewhat beyond the letter of the law, in order to obviate possible future
68. Sections 521-523 of Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (1980). Cf Arnold & Rohner, The
"Most Favored Lender" Doctrine for Federally Insured Financial Institutions- What Are Its
Boundaries?, 31 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1 (1981).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 741 (1981).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 570.11.
7 1. Supra note 6 1.
72. See U.S. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., [1974-1980 Decisions Transfer Binder] Cons.
Cred. Guide (CCH) 1 97,732 (D.D.C. 1979) (consent judgment imposing on creditor a specific
formula for determining and disclosing reasons for adverse action under regulation B).
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violations. Problems arise when this policy is applied to assure compliance
with precise and detailed regulations like the Truth in Lending or Equal
Credit Opportunity Acts. For broad standard setting, however, the FTC
rulemaking process is long and complex,73 and any final rules are subject to
legislative veto and therefore are politically vulnerable. A recent federal court
of appeals decision, on the other hand, has held that the FTC may not use
individual cease and desist proceedings to create new standards of general
application.74 This may effectively create a vacuum in which the FTC is
unable to pursue its mandate aggressively either through rulemaking or case-
by-case prosecutions.
In contrast, each of the five financial institution supervisory agencies is
charged to protect the safety and soundness of its constituent depository
institutions; that is, to assure the survival of the institution for the benefit of
investors and depositors. This concern can cause friction with consumer
protection goals. Some would even argue there is an open conflict of interest.
Some evidence would be the Federal Reserve Board's general reluctance to
take on consumer protection responsibilities and the banking agencies' lack of
vigorous enforcement (at least prior to 1977). And, of course, each agency is
subject to many pulls and tugs which may distract it from an objective
assessment of proper consumer protection policies.75
3. OTHER OBSTACLES TO UNIFORMITY
Beyond these regulatory problems exist still other difficulties in the quest
for uniformity. Many of the federal laws permit enforcement by private
action. Given the sometimes imprecise and often open-ended nature of some
of these laws, like the Truth in Lending Act, and the liberal remedy structure
that has invited consumers to inject a truth in lending claim in virtually every
credit dispute,7 6 it is not surprising that significant nonuniform case law
development has occurred. Perhaps the best, or worst, example is the litigation
concerning disclosure of the right of acceleration and its consequences, an
issue that neither the statute nor the regulation specifically contemplated. 7
Not until 1980 did the Supreme Court finally resolve this issue in Ford Motor
Credit Company v. Milhollin.8 Its opinion also marked out the standard for
judicial handling of similar issues in the future by indicating that the view of
the regulatory agency should control unless "demonstrably irrational," and
73. See Smith, Standards for FTC Rulemaking, in Recent Developments, Annual Survey of
Consumer Financial Services Law, 36 Bus. Law. 1248 (1981).
74. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981) withdrawn pending rehearing.
75. For example, NCUA's institutions are concerned with the unique "common bond" among
depositors, borrowers, and management; FHLBB has current worries over thrift survival; the
FRB's dominant concern is monetary policy.
76. See, e.g., Willenzik & Leymaster, Annual Survey-Recent Trends in Truth-in-Lending
Litigation, 35 Bus. Law. 1197 (1980).
77. Id. at 1204.
78. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
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that if the regulatory agency is silent on the matter, the courts should hesitate
to fill a gap that might have been intentional.79
In some ways, perhaps the most significant lack of uniformity on the federal
level stems from the failure of Congress to exercise fully the authority upon
which all of its actions so far described are predicated." Quite clearly in
deference to the long-standing interest of the states in the area of consumer
credit, Congress determined to preserve a role for the states. It has retained a
measure of federalism in three ways.
First, several of the federal acts permit transactions that are subject to
substantially similar state laws and to adequate state enforcement to be
exempted from coverage under the federal law."' For example, through this
process creditors in Oklahoma are governed by Oklahoma law and not by the
Truth in Lending Act."' Even though in practical experience the state law
must be virtually "the same as" the federal law rather than "substantially
similar," over time there is an all but inevitable divergence because federal
amendments less protective of the consumer need not be picked up by the
state, nor is the state precluded from enacting more protective changes."
Second, only "inconsistent" state laws are preempted, and then only to the
extent of inconsistency. The definition of inconsistency varies among the
several federal acts, but generally it does not preclude state laws that are
different from the federal, including those that are "more protective,"
whatever that means.8" Clearly, uniformity is not inherent in this system
except for a basic core, and that core might at best be only "quasi-uniform,"
79. The Milhollin case is extensively discussed in Willenzik and Schmelzer, Annual Survey-
Truth in Lending Activities During 1980, 36 Bus. Law. 1133, 1134-41 (1981). See also, Fischer
& Abbott, Supreme Court Truth in Lending Decisions: Historical Footnotes or Precedents for
Judicial Sanity, J. Retail Banking, Vol. III, No. 4 (Dec. 1981), at 64.
80. All authority in this area emanates from the commerce or currency powers of Congress
under the Constitution. Federal law being paramount, Congress could have preempted the entire
area. See, e.g., Miller, The Problem of Preemption in Consumer Credit Regulation, 3 Okla. City
U.L. Rev. 529, 531 (1979).
81. This is true, for example, for restrictions on garnishment, the Truth in Lending, Fair
Credit Billing, Consumer Leasing, Equal Credit Opportunity, Fair Debt Collection Practices,
and Electronic Fund Transfers Acts. However, it is not true in the case of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act of the Bankruptcy Code.
82. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12, Supp. IlI, Par. (c) (1981).
83. A discussion of the Oklahoma experience appears in Miller, Living with Both the UCCC
and Regulation Z, 26 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1973). See also Note, Consumer Protection: Amendments
to Truth in Lending Act, 28 Okla. L. Rev. 567 (1975).
84. Compare § I I I (a) ( I ) of the Truth in Lending Act (state laws relating to the disclosure of
information in connection with credit transactions are preempted to the extent those laws are
inconsistent but only to the extent of the inconsistency) with section 705(f) of Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (similar language to the Truth in Lending Act but adding that a state law is not
inconsistent if the law gives greater protection to a protected person). Regulatory provisions may
elaborate on these statutory standards. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b) (old Regulation Z) and 12
C.F.R. § 202.11 (regulation B).
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as in the case of the Truth in Lending Act where even inconsistent state
disclosures may be made so long as they are "separated." 5
Third, and by far the leading spoiler of uniformity, is the mechanism
invented by Congress, sometimes called reverse preemption, where the federal
enactment provides that a specific state statute can override the federal
preemption and reinstate state law no matter how dissimilar it may be to the
federal enactment.
86
B. Failures Associated with Nonuniformity
1. POLICY DISSONANCE
Unfortunately, the limited preemption posture of some federal laws, while
preserving as much state policy as possible, often operates to create a new
hybrid policy which either does not make sense or represents a position not
desired by either level of government. The first situation is illustrated by the
current state of affairs with respect to truth in lending in Oklahoma. Because
transactions involving federally chartered lenders are not covered by the
Oklahoma exemption,87 a national bank may begin to comply with the
simplified federal truth in lending rules immediately,88 but since the state
disclosure rules are not preempted, the bank must also comply with the
present older version of the Truth in Lending Act which still is Oklahoma
law. 89 There is obviously no gain in that, and no sense.
An example of the second situation occurred in a case involving the federal
restrictions on garnishment and the Ohio statute regulating garnishment.90
Essentially, the federal statute was found to preempt state law in part but not
in whole, which produced a rule not in accord with the views of either the
federal or state officials and a policy arguably more restrictive as to garnish-
ment than either Congress or the Ohio legislature had intended."
Somewhat less inadvertent but no less deleterious is the vicious circle
Congress created with respect to truth in lending simplification. Concerned
with the problems of inconsistent state disclosure rules and excessively
85. 12 C.F.R. § 226,6(c) (1981). Under new Regulation Z, the rule is less clear but arguably
the same-at least until the Federal Reserve Board determines that state law is in fact
inconsistent. 12 C.F.R. § 226.28(a)(4).
86. This method has been used in the preemption of state usury laws contained in title V of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. See §§ 501(b)(2),
5 12(2), 525. It also finds limited use in the Bankruptcy Code in § 522(b)(1) dealing with
exemptions.
87. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12, Supp. Ill, Par. (c)(l) (1981).
88. Although the simplification amendments to the Truth in Lending Act are generally not
mandatory until October I, 1982, creditors may comply with revised Regulation Z any time after
April 1, 1981. A discussion of this matter appears in Willenzik & Schmelzer, supra note 79, at
1158.
89. The problem lies with the state law, which is ironic as it was this state law that had to be
substantially similar to obtain an exemption from federal law in the first place.
90. Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio, 1971).
91. A more extensive discussion appears in Leonard & Tidwell, Consumer Credit Regulation:
Is Federal Preemption Necessary?, 35 Bus, Law. 1291, 1297 (1980).
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detailed disclosures resulting in "information overload" for consumers,"
Congress addressed these problems by authorizing the Federal Reserve Board
to make determinations relating to state-law inconsistency that carried
insulation from liability both under the federal law and under state law. 9
Rather than dehorn the problem by preemptive amputation, Congress simply
bucked it to the Federal Reserve Board. To date, however, at least with
respect to closed-end disclosure, there has been no rush for determinations.
Rather, creditors are adding all the required state, and any additional,
information to their credit contracts, often resulting in longer forms and
probably even more confusion from inconsistency and massive information
overload than was the case previously.
The hands-down winner for poor policy is unquestionably the method that
lets reenacted state law override the federal, as it not only leads to non-
uniformity but allows a state to veto the federal policy." Perhaps the prime
example is section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code. It was widely recognized that
under the old bankruptcy law, which allowed the bankrupt only the exemp-
tions permitted by the state, people in Texas and some other states survived
bankruptcy better than debtors in more parsimonious jurisdictions.9" A
national law should have uniform national application, and for that reason
section 522 of the new code created a set of federal exemptions. But section
522(b)( I) allows a state to opt out. More than thirty states have done so, thus
destroying uniformity and making a mockery of the federal policy embodied
in both the Bankruptcy Code and the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution.96
These examples point up the difficulty of trying to construct uniform policy
on a federal model, with the states and the national government acting
independently and often seemingly at odds with each other.
2. COST AND LIABILITY
The complexity and lack of certainty generated by multiple sources of law
obviously increase the cost of consumer credit protection, to the real benefit of
no one if the complexity and uncertainty are not objectively warranted.
92. See O'Connor, Annual Survey-Truth in Lending Simplification, 36 Bus. Law. 1161
(1981) and S. Rep. No. 73, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 281-82.
93. Section I I I(a)(l) of the Truth in Lending Act, as amended. A discussion of the liability
problem appears in Miller, supra note 80, at 533.
94. The counterargument is that it allows variance for local conditions. Somehow that seems
more an argument against the fact of federal action than one in support of the form it takes.
95. See. e.g., Prefatory Note to Uniform Exemptions Act in Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1976). Ironically, this uniform state act
was promulgated in an attempt to alleviate through state action the contemplated lack of
uniformity.
96. Court manufactured limitations, such as in Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1981 ), requiring any state exemption law to offer at least some exemptions comparable to those in
§ 522, do not seriously qualify this observation.
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Reliable cost-benefit analyses are lacking in this area, but limited studies have
indicated that the compliance costs for consumer protection laws are consider-
able.97 In addition, complexity and uncertainty that carry with them signifi-
cant potential liability may operate to pervert the purpose of the law. It is no
secret, for example, that truth in lending serves less to inform consumers than
as a litigation tool to permit consumers leverage on issues where they
otherwise would have none.9" While perhaps no law or set of laws can ever
strike a perfect balance in this regard, there seems little debate that the dual
structure of consumer credit regulation that prevailed through most of the
1970s was substantially imperfect.
3. RELATIONSHIP OF CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL AGENCIES
On the federal level itself, it is clear that uneven compliance burdens,
uneven consumer protections, and conflicting agency roles are all undesirable.
The fragmented structure that produces these results derives from the
piecemeal handling of consumer issues by Congress. One could argue then
that the answer is obvious:
Congress should exercise much closer and more detailed supervision, and
leave less of the law making to federal agencies. However, the credit
marketplace may be in such a constant state of flux that it would be unwise for
Congress to attempt to regulate that market comprehensively and systemati-
cally by statute. The legislative process is too imprecise, and changes occur too
fast, to carve the ground rules in statutory stone. Moreover, although there is
no overall federal consumer credit code, Congress has in fact made major
value judgments about the credit marketplace: full disclosure, nondiscrimina-
tion, no unfair or deceptive practices, access to personal information (fair
credit reporting), and so on. The recent and pending usury preemptions
embody other policies: competitive pricing without credit subsidization or
allocation. Ideally, it may be that administrative agencies, operating under
properly circumscribed grants of authority, are in a better position to perform
those functions that create and maintain consistent policy from the federal
level: monitoring and appraisal of marketplace activity on a routine basis; and
adoption, modification, or repeal of specific standards through interpretations
and enforcement activity. It is hoped that agency accountability can be
maintained through regular and rigorous Congressional oversight. The fed-
eral agencies are prone, however, to uncoordinated-and hence nonuniform-
law making, as described above, so that the problem of inconsistency at the
federal level remains. Just as Congress has been unwilling to come seriously to
97. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Exercise of Consumer
Rights Under the Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair Credit Billing Acts, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 363
(1978); Peterson, The Costs of Consumer Credit Regulation, Issues in Bank Regulation (Winter
1979) (available as Reprint No. 13, Credit Research Center, Purdue Univ.).
98. See Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 669, 684.
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grips with the problems of inconsistent state laws, so too has it failed to keep
the federal agencies' roles aligned.
One tends to think of the fragmented federal agency regulatory structure as
the result of Congress' piecemeal approach to consumer protection laws.
While this is no doubt true, in the sense that Congress put that structure in
place, it may be more accurate to think of that structure as the cause of
federal-level nonuniformity. That is, if it be conceded that Congress cannot
and should not attempt to control every facet, and all the detail, of the
consumer marketplace by explicit federal statute, then the overall implemen-
tation of consistent federal policy (through regulations, interpretations, and
enforcement strategies) can only be done consistently and with balance by the
regulatory agencies acting in concert. And this they have not done.
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980s
Despite the policies of the current administration, there is no basis whatso-
ever either for a complete federal takeover of the regulation of consumer
financial services, or for a complete federal abdication of that role in favor of
the states. If neither of these drastic restructurings is likely, what then is
possible to improve the current state of affairs? The answers lie in efforts to
produce better coordination at both levels of government and between them.
A. State Action
A number of advantages adhere to state action:
1. EXPERIMENTATION
Generally, an individual state can experiment more easily than when a
national policy is involved, as there are fewer interests to balance and the risk
is less if the experiment misfires. For example, out of three or four different
ways to address the problem, perhaps the flat eradication of holder-in-due-
course in consumer transactions was the crudest instrument.99 Nonetheless,
tie FTC rule"" chose that technique, depriving the states of their chance to try
more surgical methods.
2. DIVERSITY
In many cases, a core of uniformity is all that is called for; differences for
local conditions or views beyond that are not harmful and are indeed
desirable. For example, the fact that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act does
not prohibit consideration of an applicant's age should not preclude a state
99. For example, one might treat the problem as one of unconscionability. One might use a
notice concept as the 1969 version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code did. One might allow
holder in due course status in return for other benefits, such as a lower interest rate.
100. Supra note 24.
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that perceives that older persons are subject to discrimination from forbidding
inquiries as to age if it believes the benefit offsets the detriment."'
3. RESPONSIVENESS
If for no other reason than scale, state regulation and enforcement of
consumer credit regulations is likely to be more effective and more responsive
to particular circumstances. Perhaps it is simply that state legislators and
bureaucrats are more reachable and are spread less thinly. Certainly it is true
that many state legislatures have responded to the interest-rate crunch by
adjusting rate ceilings upward to maintain the market, or have adopted
widespread reforms (such as through the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
[UCCC] or comparable legislation), with the approval of the voters. Simi-
larly, state agencies have at times been aggressive enforcers of the consumer
protection laws, also with apparent public approbation.' °2 In any event, overall
this sort of local government involvement seems more efficient and perhaps
more beneficial than widespread private litigation, a perspective evinced by
the emphasis on restitution and the deemphasis on private action in the Truth
in Lending Simplification Act.'
4. BALANCE
Perhaps because the initial involvement in this area was at the state level,
federal intrusion has tended to be piecemeal. For example, the Truth in
Lending Act was not designed to have an impact on state law apart from
disclosure.' Nonetheless, it soon became obvious that the policy involved in
disclosure of cash discounts'05 was being frustrated when state law character-
ized the discount as a finance charge. The federal law was then amended to
cure the difficulty.' 6 The point is, consumer credit is a unitary whole and not
just a series of parts. As the National Commission on Consumer Finance
observed in its report, considerations involving remedies are inextricably
interwoven with rates and availability. 7 Thus for Congress to preempt state
rate ceilings without giving attention to consumer protection provisions would
101. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 l(b)(I)(iv) (1981) nonetheless preempts such a state determination.
102. One of us concedes that the hypothesis in the preceding sentences can be advanced for
purposes of argument, but has grave doubts whether more than a small handful of states are
capable or prepared to undertake the systematic policing of consumer markets. In the worst case,
state legislators and bureaucrats may be "reachable" in the wrong sense of the word.
103. Sections 108(e) and 130 of the Truth in Lending Act, as amended.
104. Section III of the Truth in Lending Act makes this clear.
105. Under section 167 of the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666f, a discount offered by
a seller to induce payment by cash or other means not involving the use of a credit card is not a
finance charge to be disclosed and no card issuer may prohibit a seller from offering such a
discount.
106. Section 171(c) of the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666j.
107. Supra note 2, at 24.
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certainly unbalance the market."0 8 Continuous state involvement can then be
justified to maintain desirable equilibrium.
Obviously, in matters affecting the conduct of business on a nationwide
scale, efficient state government can be conducted only under uniform state
laws. Notwithstanding this truth and the cited benefits of actions at the state
level, the quest for uniformity within a reasonable period at the state level has
not gone well. To cite merely two examples, even though a substantial number
of states have availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by section
522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, none has chosen to enact the Uniform
Exemptions Act. And, with the exception of Minnesota, which is considering
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, none of the states opting out of the
federal preemption of usury laws has done so by enacting the balance of a
realistic rate structure and consumer protections that constitutes the UCCC,
although several states opting out, like Colorado and Maine, were already
UCCC states. While it is undoubtedly both foolish and presumptuous to
predict, this past history would seem to bode ill for action on the state level
alone. As state diversity, bred by limited preemption and reverse preemption,
increases and the attendant complexity and uncertainty lead to more substan-
tial costs and impinge on policy goals, it is likely the federal level will not play
a diminishing role.
B. Balanced Dual Action
What the federal role will be is still largely unformulated. It is reasonably
clear that, overall, the limited approach that was tried in the 1970s out of
deference to our federal system has not worked well. It is less clear what will
replace it. Full federal preemption is at best a theoretical possibility. Nothing
at present indicates the likelihood of such a major shift and there is still much
evidence to the contrary, including S. 1720, which in one part would broadly
preempt state usury laws but which still contains an opt-out feature, and
which in another part would broadly preempt state laws within the scope of
the Truth in Lending Act but again allows a state to override the preemption.
Nor can one read bills like S. 1720 as contemplating a full-scale revival of
state control. 109
As further thought is devoted to these issues, it must become obvious the old
methods will not suffice. Rather, other ideas are needed.
108. Congress provided linkage between rates and contract protections only in connection
with usury preemption in transactions involving residential manufactured housing under section
501 (c) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
109. Some measure of retrenchment at the federal level may occur in the name of "deregula-
tion," but this will be more like the simplification of the Truth in Lending Act than a wholesale
reallocation of law-making and enforcement authority to the states. The credit industry itself,
engaged in or poised for interstate operations, wants no return to the pre-1970 state law
hodgepodge.
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1. LIMITED PREEMPTION AND CONTROLLED EXPANSION
One possibility has already been used by Congress in Section 1 l l(b)(2) of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act."' It is to allow the federal level to
establish a preemptive core of rules but to allow the states to create a
penumbra of additional protective rules provided that they furnish signifi-
cantly increased benefits and do not unduly burden interstate commerce. A
federal regulatory agency, presumably the Federal Reserve Board, would be
charged with making the determinations.1 This approach would permit the
diversity for local conditions that is said to be the virtue of the reserve
preemption method but would not allow the overturn of a minimum federal
standard.
2. FEDERAL CONTRACT
A somewhat simpler concept than the one just described but one which is
also based on a variation of the reverse preemption approach is the idea of an
optional federal standard. This concept would have Congress enact the body
of rules it determined was fair for consumer credit transactions; e.g., it would
write a sort of "federal contract" and the boundaries into which it would fit."12
The product might not be greatly different from an updated and expanded
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Then creditors, not states, would be allowed
to opt out. They could gain the advantages, say, of a higher rate under the
federal law by also incorporating into their transactions certain consumer
protections specified in that federal law, e.g., no attorney's fees on collection.
In theory, this would allow a multistate creditor to choose a uniform law and
leave intrastate creditors, familiar with their own laws, to choose that law
rather than the uniform federal terms if they wished.
3. FEDERAL LEVEL UNIFORMITY
It is also unlikely that the old ways of operation at the federal level alone
will suffice in the 1980s and beyond.
By one view, the present fragmented system is the best we can do. We more
or less understand it, and there may be some value in having different agencies
bring different approaches to consumer protection. Status quo, however,
connotes an unchanging system, and the pattern in recent years is toward
more and more splintering of regulatory roles. Regulatory chaos may lie along
this path.
An alternative would be to assign all regulation writing for consumer credit
to one existing agency. This would tend to eliminate multiagency frictions and
overlaps with respect to rulemaking, but would not remove the problems of
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2313 (1975).
111. A more detailed explanation appears in Leonard & Tidwell, Consumer Credit Regula-
tion: Is Federal Preemption Necessary?, 35 Bus. Law. 1291, 1308-1309 (1980).
112. This approach is the idea of Nathaniel E. Butler, former associate director of the division
of consumer and community affairs at the Federal Reserve Board.
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inconsistent interpretation and application of those rules, especially through
enforcement actions. To the extent all the existing agencies have special
constituencies, and ingrained attitudes and track records, none is ideally
situated to take on the larger policy function; the assignment of all rulemaking
to one such agency could compound those institutional conflicts. It could also
be viewed as a "victory" of one agency's philosophy over another's.
Still, some measure of rulemaking consolidation into an existing agency
could be a useful intermediate step toward more comprehensive realignment.
The most obvious candidates would be the Federal Trade Commission
(because of its longstanding jurisdiction over unfair or deceptive acts or
practices) or the Federal Reserve Board (because of its extensive regulation
writing experience under various statutes like the Truth in Lending Act). " 3
A more far-reaching proposal would be a new bureaucratic unit with a
structure derived from recommendations of the National Commission on
Consumer Finance."' With changed circumstances and much new law,
however, the entity would have a somewhat different configuration than the
"Bureau of Consumer Credit" proposed by NCCF.
Regulatory responsibility for the consumer credit market would be vested in
this new bureaucratic entity, with the following features:
(a) the new regulatory entity would be autonomous and free standing, or
perhaps allied generally with all the existing agencies having supervisory roles
for the consumer credit market; in any event it would not be subservient to any
existing agency's dictates. Examples of the kind of stature this entity should
enjoy are found in the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Consumer
Product Safety Commission;
(b) the new regulatory body would have exclusive authority to issue
regulations and rules (and interpretations) in several areas-it would issue all
regulations necessary to implement federal consumer credit legislation, i.e., it
would assume the functions now performed by the Federal Reserve Board,
FHLBB, and HUD (with respect to RESPA) and it would be the exclusive
source of rules proscribing unlawful practices in consumer credit transactions,
replacing the present FTC, Federal Reserve Board, and FHLBB authority in
that area;
(c) all the agencies exercising line supervisory responsibilities for segments
of the consumer credit industry would continue to function under their
traditional mandates-e.g., to assure the safety and soundness of depository
institutions. Where those agencies acted to authorize new forms of customer
services, the new centralized entity would have limited authority to regulate
the consumer protection aspects of those transactions. For example, the
bureau should have the last word on disclosure requirements for adjustable
rate mortgages authorized by the OCC, FHLBB, or NCUA;
113. See note 108, supra.
114. Supra note 2, at 58-59.
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(d) existing agencies with enforcement responsibility (and enforcement
apparatus, such as bank examinations) would continue to perform that
function. But to assure that the laws and regulations were applied
consistently and evenly, the new regulatory entity would perform a coordinat-
ing and supervisory role with respect to the enforcement efforts of the line
agencies (comparable to the functions of the present Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council).
Centralized standard setting accomplished in this manner could eliminate
or reduce the undesirable effects of the present regulatory fragmentation; the
centralized regulator would be less susceptible to the ingrained and at times
conflicting concerns of the line agencies for safety and soundness; the bureau
would be a central repository of knowledge and expertise about the entire
consumer credit marketplace; the entity should be able to reflect a balanced
sensitivity to all consumers and all parts of the industry; and the centralized
entity could more efficiently deal with common concerns such as complaint
handling, consumer education, and coordination with state officials.
On the negative side, the creation of a new entity could be perceived as a
new layer of bureaucracy in an era of deregulation, or as the first step toward
consolidating all bank regulatory functions. In fact, by displacing separate
consumer credit shops in a number of existing agencies the new entity could
result in a net reduction in the bureaucracy; but the issue of a single bank
regulator is far beyond the scope of this suggestion. More substantively, the
creation of a strong new entity could be frustrated by the logistics of
relocating personnel from existing agencies (with attendant rivalries and
desire to retain their best people), or of staffing up from scratch; lacking its
own enforcement arm, or examination powers, the agency might suffer from
lack of in-house expertise on marketplace practices; and centralization could
preclude healthy regulatory competition.
Whatever the merits of these views, before centralization or rulemaking can
occur, a number of matters need further analysis. This analysis could be
conducted by Congress directly (through hearings, with or without draft
enabling legislations), by an independent study commission, or even by a task
force of representatives from the existing agencies. Open issues include, but
are not necessarily limited to:
(a) should the agency's area of responsibility be limited to consumer credit,
narrowly defined? What of electronic fund transfer services, or the noncon-
sumer aspects of ECOA? Should the scope include deposit services, or all
financial services for consumers? At what point would the regulatory respon-
sibility of the new entity stop and the organic supervisory powers of the
existing agencies continue, e.g., who would issue regulations authorizing and
dictating the substance of variable rate mortgages?
(b) would the agency be altogether free standing, or could it function
properly as a component of some larger structure-e.g., might it be put on a
basis comparable to the FFIEC but with broader membership? How would it
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be funded, through Congressional appropriations, "user" fees, or assessments
against existing agencies? Would its work be directed by a single administra-
tor, or by a board or commission, and if the latter, with how many members,
selected on what basis?
(c) what agency powers would be necessary to carry out its mandate? The
power to require reports from other agencies, state and federal? To subpoena
documents and testimony from witnesses? To intervene in other agency
proceedings, either in connection with the enforcement of existing rules, or
with respect to corporate mergers or acquisitions which might affect competi-
tion in consumer markets? Should the agency operate under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act or otherwise?
(d) to what extent, and how, would existing agencies be assured of input
into the decision making of the new agency affecting institutions supervised by
those existing agencies?
IV. CONCLUSION
Fragmented federal rulemaking in the consumer credit area has led to
uneven application of standards, conflicting and inconsistent rules, and
anomalous overlaps and gaps in regulatory coverage. Dual sources of law
between federal and state levels, with limited preemption of state legislation
and in many cases even state preemption of federal law, has led to uncertainty,
complexity, and other undesirable consequences. As the volume of legislation
and other standard-setting activity increases in this area, these undesirable
consequences multiply. What will prove workable to replace a structure that
has largely outlived its feasibility is undetermined as the 1980s begin. While
this article has made several suggestions, perhaps all that can be safely
concluded is that the 1980s are not likely to see markedly fewer sources of
consumer financial services law but are likely to see more consistency and
uniformity in the sources that survive.
